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Abstract
We present a simple technique that allows capsule models to detect adversarial
images. In addition to being trained to classify images, the capsule model is
trained to reconstruct the images from the pose parameters and identity of the
correct top-level capsule. Adversarial images do not look like a typical member
of the predicted class and they have much larger reconstruction errors when the
reconstruction is produced from the top-level capsule for that class. We show that
setting a threshold on the l2 distance between the input image and its reconstruction
from the winning capsule is very effective at detecting adversarial images for three
different datasets. The same technique works quite well for CNNs that have been
trained to reconstruct the image from all or part of the last hidden layer before the
softmax. We then explore a stronger, white-box attack that takes the reconstruction
error into account. This attack is able to fool our detection technique but in order
to make the model change its prediction to another class, the attack must typically
make the ”adversarial” image resemble images of the other class.
1 Introduction
Sabour et al. [2017] show that the discriminative performance of a capsule network can be improved
by adding another network that reconstructs the input image from the pose parameters and the identity
of the correct top-level capsule. Derivatives back-propagated through the reconstruction network
force the pose parameters of the top-level capsule to capture a lot of information about the image.
A capsule network trained with such a regularizer can output not only a classification, but also a
class conditional reconstruction of the input. We show that the reconstruction sub-network can be
used as a very effective way to detect adversarial attacks: we reconstruct the input from the identity
and pose parameters of the winning top-level capsule to verify that the network is perceiving what
we expect it to perceive in a typical example of that class. We propose DARCCC which is an
attack independent detection technique relying on the difference between the distribution of class
reconstruction distances for genuine images vs adversarial images. We extend DARCCC to more
standard image classification networks (convolution neural networks) and we show the effectiveness
of our detection method against black box attacks and typical white box attacks on three image
data-sets; MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and SVHN.
Our detection method can be defeated by a stronger white-box attack that uses a method (R-BIM)
that takes the reconstruction error into account and iteratively perturbs the image so as to allow good
reconstruction. However, this stronger attack does not produce typical adversarial images that look
like the original image but with a small amount of added noise. Instead, in order to make the model
classify the image incorrectly, the perturbation to the original image must be substantial and typically
leads to an ”adversarial” image that actually resembles other images of the target class. Moreover, for
a capsule network, if enough weight is put on the reconstruction error to avoid detection, it is often
impossible to change the image in a way that causes the desired misclassification.
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Figure 1: The reconstructions from the predicted class pose parameters of a trained capsule network
for real data and successfully adversary of same data with a target class of ’1’. The reconstructions
from adversarial data resemble a ’1’ more than the input image.
2 Background
Biggio et al. [2013] introduced the adversaries for Machine Learning systems. Imperceptible
adversarial images for Deep Neural Networks were introduced by Szegedy et al. [2013] where they
used a second order optimizer. Fast Gradient Sign method (Goodfellow et al.) showed that by taking
an  step in the direction of the gradient, − sign(∇XJ(X, label)), one can change the label of the
input image X . Such adversarial attacks which have access to the attacked model are called “white
box” attacks. Goodfellow et al. also showed the effectiveness of “black box” attacks where the
adversarial images for a model is used to attack another model. Basic Iterative Method (Kurakin et al.
[2016]) takes multiple α-wide FGSM steps in the  ball of the original image.
Kurakin et al. [2018] provides an overview of the oscillating surge of attacks and defenses. Recently
several generative approaches are proposed (Samangouei et al. [2018], Ilyas et al. [2017], Meng and
Chen [2017]) which assume adversarial images does not exist on the input image manifold. Carlini
and Wagner [2017] depicts failure of such adversarial detection techniques. Jetley et al. [2018] and
Gilmer et al. [2018] investigate relation of adversarial images to the accuracy of the model and to the
input manifold. Since our method conditions on the prediction of the model for generating an image
it does not depend on this assumptions. Most recently, Schott et al. [2018] investigated effectiveness
of a class conditional generative model as a defense mechanism for MNIST digits. Our method in
comparison, does not increase the computational overhead of the classification.
Sabour et al. [2015] shows that adversaries exist for a network with random weights. Therefore,
susceptibility to adversarial attacks is not caused by learning and the convolution neural network
architectures are inherently fragile. Capsule networks (Sabour et al. [2017], Hinton et al. [2018]) are
a new neural network architecture where neurons activate based on agreement of incoming vectors
and defer architecturally from Convolutional neural networks. This new architecture has been proven
to be more robust to white box attacks while being as weak as CNNs in defending black box attacks.
In this work we address this shortcoming by introducing an adversarial detection mechanism based
on reconstruction sub-network of CapsNets. Furthermore, we extend this technique to typical CNNs.
3 Method
The reconstruction network of the CapsNet proposed in Sabour et al. [2017] takes in the pose
parameters of all the class capsules and mask all values to 0 except for the pose parameters of the
predicted class. During training they optimize the l2 distance of input image and reconstruction along
side the classification loss. We use the same reconstruction network for detecting adversarial attacks
by measuring the euclidean distance between the input and a prediction reconstruction. Fig. 2 shows
a sample histogram of distances for natural images vs adversarial images. We leverage the difference
between the two mentioned distributions and propose DARCCC for detecting adversaries based on
the reconstruction from classification. DARCCC distinguishes adversaries by thresholding images
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Figure 2: The histogram of l2 distances between the reconstruction and the input for each model, for
real and adversarial data for MNIST. We used FGSM with  = 0.3 to create the attacks.
based on their reconstruction distance. Fig. 1 shows the reconstructions from real and adversarial
data; the deviation of the adversarial reconstructions from input image motivates this approach.
Although the system above is designed for informative pose parameters of the CapsNet, the strategy
can be extended beyond CapsNets. We create a similar architecture, “Masked CNN+R”, by using a
standard CNN and dividing the penultimate hidden layer into groups corresponding each class. The
sum of each neuron group serves as the logit for that particular class and the group itself is passed to
the reconstruction sub-network via the same masking operation used by Sabour et al. [2017]. We also
study the role of class conditional reconstruction by omitting the masking and experimenting with a
typical “CNN+R” model whose entire penultimate layer is used for reconstruction.
3.1 Detection threshold
We find the threshold for DARCCC based on the expected distance between a validation input image
and its reconstruction. If the distance between the input and the reconstruction is above the chosen
threshold DARCCC classifies the data as adversarial. Choosing the threshold poses a trade off
between false positive and false negative detection rates. Therefore, it should be chosen based on
the assumed likelihood of the system being attacked. Such a trade off is discussed by Gilmer et al.
[2018]. In our experiments we don’t tune this parameter to attacks and set it as the 95th percentile of
validation distances. This means our false positive rate on real validation data is 5%.
4 Experiments
The three models, Capsule, CNN+R, and Masked CNN+R, are designed to have the same number of
parameters. Fig. A.1 shows the architecture we use for each one. For our experiments, all were trained
with the same Adam optimizer and for the same number of epochs. We did not do an exhaustive
parameters search on these models, instead we chose hyper-parameters that allowed each model to
perform roughly equivalently on the test sets. Tab. 1 shows the test accuracy of these trained models
on the three datasets in our experiments, MNIST [LeCun et al., 1998], FashionMNIST [Xiao et al.,
2017], and SVHN [Netzer et al., 2011].
4.1 Black box adversarial attack detection
To test DARCCC on a black box attack, we trained a standard CNN with two layers of convolutions
and 2 hidden layers without the aforementioned reconstruction network, and used it to create
adversarial attacks using the Fast Gradient Sign Method. Fig. 3 plots the error rate, the attack
detection rate, and the successful attack detection rate for each of the 3 models over varying . For all
Table 1: The test accuracy of each model for each dataset in our experiments.
Dataset Capsule Model CNN+R Model Masked CNN+R Model
MNIST 0.994 0.993 0.994
FashionMNIST 0.904 0.905 0.907
SVHN 0.890 0.907 0.905
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Figure 3: DARCCC detection rates and black box FGSM attack error rates for different .
Figure 4: DARCCC detection rate and white box BIM attack success rate at different steps.
3 models, DARCCC not only accurately detects the successful attacks (Successful Attack Detection
Rate, attacks which changed the networks classification), it detects perturbations regardless of if they
changed the networks classification as well (Attack Detection Rate).
4.2 White box adversarial attack detection
We tested DARCCC against white box Basic Iterative Method adversarial attacks targeting each class.
We use α = 0.01 and  = α×Nsteps. We also clipped the result to be between 0 and 1. The success
rate of the attack (flipping the classification to the target class), the attack detection rate (whether the
image is tampered with), and the successful attack detection rates (detecting images whose prediction
has flipped) are plotted in Fig. 4 for all three models and for the 3 data sets as a function of the number
of steps. For all models, DARCCC is able to detect attacks to some degree for Fashion MNIST and
MNIST, but on the capsule model it is able to detect adversaries on SVHN as well.
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Seed Image
R-BIM to 0 for Capsule
R-BIM to 0 for Masked-CNN+R
R-BIM to 0 for CNN+R
Figure 5: Top row are the starting SVHN images which are R-BIM attacked to ‘0’. The next rows
show the successful generated adversary for Capsule, Masked-CNN+R and CNN+R model.
Figure 6: R-BIM attack success rate and DARCCC detection rate for different steps.
4.2.1 Reconstructive BIM attack
Targeted BIM takes gradient steps to maximize the classification probability of the target class. Since
the reconstruction distance is also differentiable we modify BIM into R-BIM which additionally
minimizes the reconstruction distance. R-BIM is designed specifically to break DARCCC. Fig. 5
visualizes the initial input and the result of 100 steps of R-BIM with a target class of ‘0’ for 10
random SVHN images. We see that indeed several of the crafted examples look like ‘0’s. Effectively
they are not adversarial images at all since they resemble their predicted class to the human eye. This
implies that the gradient is aligned with the true data manifold. Similar visualizations for MNIST and
fashion-MNIST can be found in the appendix. For Fashion-MNIST only the capsule model attacks
resemble true images from the target class. We still report the same detection rate plots as above
in Fig. 6 for R-BIM. Notably R-BIM is significantly less successful than a standard BIM attack in
changing the classification. The capsule model in particular exhibits significant resilience to this
attack.
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5 Discussion
We have presented DARCCC, a simple architectural extension that enables adversarial attack detection.
DARCCC notably relies on a similarity metric between the reconstruction and the input. This metric
is required both during training in order to train the reconstruction network and during test time
in order to flag adversarial examples. In the 3 data sets we have evaluated, the distance between
examples roughly correlates with semantic similarity. This however is not the case for images in
more complex data set such as Cifar10 or ImageNet, in which two images may be similar in terms of
content or look, but have significant l2 distance. This issue will need to be resolved for this method
to scale up to more complex problems, and offers a promising avenue for future research.
Notably DARCCC does not rely on a specific predefined adversarial attack. We have shown that
by reconstructing the input from the internal class-conditional representation, our system is able to
accurately detect black box and white box FGSM and BIM attacks. Of the three models we explored,
we showed that the capsule model was the best fitted for this task, and was able to detect adversarial
examples with greater accuracy on all the data-sets we explored. We then proposed a new, stronger
attack to beat our defense - the Reconstructive BIM attack - in which the adversary optimizes not
only the classification loss but also the reconstruction loss. We showed that this attack was less
successful than a standard attack, and in particular the capsule model showed great resilience. For
more complicated data-sets such as SVHN we showed that the detection method was not able to
detect the strong adversarial attacks, but when we visualized the perturbed images they typically
appeared to be on the true data manifold and from the target class, so they lacked the paradoxical
property of typical adversarial attacks.
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Appendix A Architecture
Fig. A.1 shows the architecture of the Capsule network and the CNN+R model used for experiments
on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and SVHN. MNSIT and Fashion-MNIST have exactly same architectures
while for SVHN experiments we use larger models. Note that the only difference between the CNN+R
and the Masked CNN+R is the masking procedure on the input to the reconstruction network based
on the predicted class. All three models have the same number of parameters for each dataset.
Figure A.1: The architecture for the CNN+R and Capsule model used for our experiments on MNIST,
Fashion-MNIST, and SVHN.
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Appendix B Histogram of distances
Fig. B.2 and Fig. B.3 visualize the histogram of euclidean distances for real Fashion-MNIST and
SVHN validation images (blue) vs the white box FGSM with  = 0.3 adversarial images (green) as a
proof of concept and motivation. We do not factor the distribution of adversarial distances for picking
DARCCC threshold. The threshold is solely based on the validation distances.
Figure B.2: FashionMNIST - The histogram of l2 distances between the reconstruction and the input
for each model, for real and adversarial data.
Figure B.3: SVHN - The histogram of l2 distances between the reconstruction and the input for each
model, for real and adversarial data.
Appendix C Black box attacks
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Appendix D R-BIM attack samples
Capsule
MaskedCNN+R
CNN+R
Figure D.4: Initial image (top) and Reconstruction BIM (100 steps of 0.01) perturbed image (bottom)
for each model. These images where successful attacks targetting the pants class. They were chosen
at random from successful attacks. Only the Capsule Model Attacks resemble images from the target
class (pants). In case of CapsNet there were no shoes successfully flipped into pants.
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Capsule
MaskedCNN+R
CNN+R
Figure D.5: Initial image (top) and Reconstruction BIM (100 steps of 0.01) perturbed image (bottom)
for each model. These images are successful attacks targetting class ‘0’. They were chosen at random
from successful attacks.
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Appendix E All Class Capsule Reconstructions
Figure E.6: Input and Reconstructions from each class capsule - This graphic explains the motivation
for using the distance between the input and reconstruction as an adversarial defense; for the most
part only the reconstructions from the correct capsule are sensible.
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Figure E.7: Input and Reconstructions from each class capsule for FGSM attacks - we can see that
the reconstructions do not look sensible for any class, neither the predicted class nor the labeled class
capsule reconstruction resemble to the input.
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